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Purpose:  To  provide  an  overview  of essential  elements  of  good  governance  of  data  linkage  for  health-
related  research,  to  consider  lessons  learned  so  far  and  to  examine  key  factors  currently  impeding  the
delivery of good  governance  in  this  area.  Given  the  considerable  hurdles  which  must  be  overcome  and  the
changing  landscape  of  health  research  and  data  linkage,  a principled,  proportionate,  risk-based  approach
to governance  is advocated.
Discussion:  In  light  of  the  considerable  value  of data  linkage  to  health  and  well-being,  the  United  Kingdom
aspires  to design  and  deliver  good  governance  in health-related  research.  A string  of  projects  have been
asking:  what  does  good  governance  look  like in  data  linkage  for  health  research?  It is  argued  here  that
considerable  progress  can and  must  be made  in  order  to develop  the  UK’s  contribution  to  future  health
and  wealth  economies,  particularly  in  light  of mis-start  initiatives  such  as  care.data  in NHS  England.  Dis-
cussion  centres  around  lessons  learned  from  previous  successful  health  research  initiatives,  identifying
those  governance  mechanisms  which  are  essential  to achieving  good  governance.
Conclusion:  This  article  suggests  that a crucial  element  in  any  step-increase  of research  capability  will be
the  adoption  of adaptive  governance  models.  These  must  recognise  a  range  of  approaches  to  delivering
safe  and  effective  data  linkage,  while  remaining  responsive  to public  and research  user  expectations
and  needs  as these  shift  and  change  with  time  and  experience.  The  targets  are  multiple  and  constantly
moving.  There  is  not  – nor  should  we  seek  – a single  magic  bullet  in  delivering  good governance  in  health
research.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY. Introduction: the problem and the vision
The recent debacle over care.data reveals yet another aspect
f the multifaceted entity that is data sharing in healthcare [1].
he government and NHS England proposal to extract data from
atient records for retention and use in a centralised database –
ith possible access from commercial entities – has not only gener-
ted considerable criticism, but led to suspension of the scheme, in
rder to allow better consultation with and involvement of patients
nd public [2]. The initiative has only very recently (partially)
e-launched, and it remains to be seen how the four pathﬁnder
rojects progress and how they are received by the public [3].
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: nayha.sethi@ed.ac.uk (N. Sethi).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2015.08.011
386-5056/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Some of us have argued elsewhere that the initiative was pre-
mature and ill-conceived for want of ‘social licence’: that it, the
false assumption that public conﬁdence in GPs could simply be
borrowed across to such an initiative [4]. This must also be set
against the 2013 Caldicott 2 Review [5] into responsible sharing
of patient data which, signiﬁcantly, added a seventh principle to
the Caldicott Guardians’ guiding principles: ‘[t]he duty to share
information can be as important as the duty to protect patient con-
ﬁdentiality’ [6]. More recently, the Cabinet Ofﬁce has published
a discussion document on data-sharing policy. It points out that
the common assumption that government departments can eas-
ily share data to improve services is false [7]. Against this, in turn,
we have the on-going uncertainty over the legal position on data
processing, driven by European Commission plans to introduce a
Data Protection Regulation to tighten up the legal regimes across
the continent [8], while in England the recent passing of the Care
article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ct 2014 now gives power to the Health Research Authority (HRA)
o authorise the processing of conﬁdential medical information
or medical research, subject to approval by an ethics committee
section 117), and requires the HRA to put ‘. . .in place and oper-
te a system for reviewing decisions’ [9]. All of this typiﬁes, and
an be seen as a reaction to, a pre-existing problem identiﬁed by
he Academy of Medical Sciences in a number of its outputs [10],
amely, that a culture of caution prevails in data sharing for (health)
esearch [11].
This is not to suggest that responsible research using health data
annot or does not happen. Indeed, the advent of the Farr Institute
f Health Informatics Research builds on projects already delivered
round the UK in each of the four nodes that make up the current
onsortium. Thus for example, SAIL [12]/CIPHER in Wales operates
n a privacy-protecting safe haven [13]. There is a secure ﬁle trans-
er system in place for data being brought into the SAIL databank.
ecure, remote data access is controlled and possible only when
uch access has been authorised. All output has to be approved.
orth of the border, the Scottish Health Informatics Programme
SHIP) has delivered a good governance framework to maximise the
alue of research using Scotland’s rich health datasets. The frame-
ork is founded upon a mechanism of risk-based proportionate
overnance that reduces unnecessary regulatory burden without
iluting appropriate scrutiny. At the University of Manchester and
n collaboration with NHS partners, a technical solution to the ‘con-
ent for consent’ problem was developed, enabling researchers
o quickly and easily determine the likelihood of recruiting the
equired number of patients for a clinical trial protocol and to enact
he recruitment process [14].
University College London (UCL) has developed an Identiﬁable
ata Handling Service (IDHS) to allow authorised researchers to
nalyse clinical research data-sets within a data safe haven [15],
here identiﬁable or pseudonymised data do not leave the secure
oundary of the system. The service has also provided training
orkshops for researchers around information governance, and
rovides assistance for research projects when seeking both Infor-
ation Toolkit Governance Level 2 compliance and exemption
rom the Common Law Duty of Conﬁdentiality under Section 251
f the NHS Act.
The vision of the Farr initiative is:
‘To harness health data for patient and public beneﬁt by setting
he international standard for the safe and secure use of electronic
atient records and other population-based datasets for research
urposes’ [16].
The consortium comprises 24 academic Institutions and two
edical Research Council (MRC) units, bolstered by an additional
20 million in capital funds from the MRC. It aims to deliver
igh-quality, cutting-edge research linking electronic health data
ith both other forms of routinely collected data and other areas
f research. It is also committed towards capacity building in
ealth informatics research. The Farr Institute aims to provide the
lectronic infrastructure to facilitate collaboration across the four
odes, support their safe use of patient and research data for health
nd social care research. It will further enable partnerships through
he provision of a physical structure which co-locates NHS organi-
ations, industry, and other UK academic centres.
The common foundational principle that underpins all of the
ork of the Farr Institute is a commitment to responsible data shar-
ng for the promotion of health and well-being. This commitment,
n turn, is founded on a belief that scientiﬁcally sound, ethically
obust data sharing for health research is in the public interest.
his does not ignore the considerable importance of appropriate
rivacy and security measures, because – equally – robust protec-
ion of privacy is also in the public interest. However, nowhere is
rotection of privacy an absolute. This is true as much in law as
n ethics. Indeed, the notion of absolute security of data is proba-dical Informatics 84 (2015) 933–940
bly an unattainable goal, and certainly a foolish policy promise. No
custodian of data should lead data subjects to believe otherwise.
Responsible data management is about professional and responsi-
ble management of risk, and risk comes in many forms. It includes,
but is not restricted to:
• invasion of privacy,
• potential discrimination or stigmatisation and resultant distress,
• economic threats and
• loss of trust.
In addition, any data custodian must consider risks to their rep-
utational integrity if unjustiﬁable or irresponsible data linkages or
disclosures are made. This is true even if such linkages or disclo-
sures are entirely lawful. Good governance is not merely a matter
of compliance with the law.
And yet the law poses considerable challenges for the data link-
age aspirations of entities like the Farr Institute. Until now, the
node activities have occurred in three distinct countries of the
United Kingdom, subject to two  different legal systems and over-
shadowed by a European regime. The vision to lead international
standards complicates matters further, especially any prospect of
international data travel. Any attempt to harmonise national – let
alone international – arrangements would be futile. There can be
no one-size-ﬁts-all approach to such rich and complex regulatory
settings. Rather, the governance approach of the Farr Institute is
considerably more realistic – to bring about mutual recognition
of standards and best practices, drawing on lessons to date from
regional successes, and considering where common ground and
approaches might be extrapolated to other environments. Approx-
imation is key.
As a crucial ﬁrst step in this process of approximation of
standards, the Farr governance team has identiﬁed critical areas
of attention which serve as the foundational elements of good
governance frameworks, and thus the starting points for further
deliberation and construction of initiatives on a larger and more
publicly-valuable scale. It is important to stress that the ethos is
one of co-production of good governance between data custodians,
potential data users, and data subjects themselves through robust
and iterative engagement. It also requires transparent development
and equitable access policies. The immediate lessons from care.data
include the serious inadequacy of assuming that it is sufﬁcient to
attempt to inform data subjects unidirectionally through leaﬂet-
ing alone. Effective communication with stakeholders, especially
with those for whom privacy is in play, must go beyond the mere
provision of information. Equally, it is not enough simply to pass
law. Care.data had a legal basis under the Health and Social Care Act
2012 [17], but this still did not prevent the adverse reaction to what
was proposed. Although the government has attempted to provide
yet further legal clarity in the Care Act 2014 for the processing of
conﬁdential medical information under the auspices of the Health
Research Authority [18], the law can do no more than lay out broad
legal parameters for operation. The real challenges will be in the
Act’s implementation through transparent responsible practices.
This is where the approach of the Farr Institute can offer important
insights.
2. The approachThe Farr initiative has drawn on its cumulative research exper-
tise thus far to reveal the following features that, we suggest, must
necessarily form part of any good governance framework.
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.1. Consent: the stalwart panacea?
One of the enduring features of discussions about what consti-
utes good governance in data linkage for research is the question
f the role of individual consent. In other contexts, such as those
nvolving research with patients’ bodies or their tissues, the need
or consent is rarely questioned. As a mechanism to give expression
o individual wishes and to give effect to individual self-rule (auton-
my), consent is seen as a self-evident truth and non-negotiable
egulatory measure of respect [19]. There has, accordingly, been
onsiderable borrowing of value from these other contexts to make
imilar claims about the crucial need for consent in information
overnance. But the settings are not the same.
When stripped of identiﬁers and other personalised character-
stics, and processed at an aggregate level, it is not clear that it
emains meaningful for any of us to talk of ‘my data’. Also, con-
ent can give an illusion of control and security, when in fact, the
nly real power that it confers is an ability to say No. And, even
f an individual says No, other factors might be in play that jus-
ify processing of data, such as signiﬁcant public interests or even
he vital interests of the individual him- or herself. For this and
ther reasons, consent is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient for legiti-
ate and lawful data protection. It is true that, if given, consent can
rovide a lawful basis for processing data [20], But, it is not strictly
eeded. Finally, consent suffers from a practical limitation in that
t is almost always an up-front, one-off event [21]. While a ‘right to
ithdraw’ can, of course, exist through the life-course of a project,
his casts consent (or, rather, refusal) as an extreme response. As
uch, consent is ill-equipped to ensure that appropriate two-way
ommunication and robust oversight of research projects delivers
n all interests that are in play.
While acknowledging the considerable value that is imbued in
onsent, the Farr Institute asks whether it is appropriate to cast
onsent as the driving governance mechanism. This is not to reject
 role for consent altogether, but rather to see consent as one part
f a cascade of governance mechanisms that can be deployed after
 robust assessment of what is at stake in any proposed linkage
cenario. This has not been the general approach to date.
.2. Anonymisation: the tower of babel?
The mantra of ‘consent or anonymise’  was the rule of thumb that
he former Patient Information Advisory Group (PIAG) used dur-
ng 2002–2004 to explain the legislation, guidelines and medical
rofessionals’ duties of conﬁdence to the research world regarding
he use of identiﬁable information outside of the care setting [22].
s information has become more widely used for research pur-
oses, the appreciation of what consent and anonymise mean has
volved, but the rule of thumb has endured. Both are separate and
istinct: the latter is a means of stripping out identifying attributes
rom datasets so that they can be used legally for purposes beyond
hich they were originally collected; the former is an afﬁrmative
ction that individuals can use to express their autonomy. It is the
ost obvious basis of expressing trust when individuals share sen-
itive information about themselves. Anonymisation, on the other
and, is used to mitigate risks of identifying individuals, protect
heir rights to privacy and to deliver the medical profession’s duty
f conﬁdentiality. It does not necessarily require consent to perform
hese roles. However in the process, anonymisation also often ren-
ers datasets less useful, because moderately identifying data are
ey to answering certain research questions: their removal makes
inking separate datasets harder, and potentially, research ﬁndings
ess robust, and potentially useless. This has resulted in both legis-
ators and data custodians trying to establish a balanced approach,
hereby bona ﬁde research uses are not unnecessarily hindered,
o not break the law, nor do they deny a role for consent wheredical Informatics 84 (2015) 933–940 935
this is thought to be necessary [23]. What is less widely acknowl-
edged is the nature of anonymisation techniques: none of these
can guarantee anonymity and current accepted practice takes a
pragmatic view over whether the risk of re-identiﬁcation is so low
that it can be discounted. For example, the Information Commis-
sioner’s Ofﬁce issued guidance in 2012 that takes such a pragmatic
approach. It recommends deploying a ‘motivated intruder’ test to
assess whether anonymisation techniques are sufﬁciently robust
to allow release or use of data. This asks whether ‘. . .a  person who
starts without any prior knowledge but who  wishes to identify
the individual from whose personal data the anonymised data has
been derived’ is reasonably likely to achieve re-identiﬁcation [24]?
Another pertinent rule of thumb is that there is always a risk of error
and/or accidental disclosure, and the counteractive techniques will
only be as good as the people who  develop and apply them. Periodic
review of techniques and procedures is crucial to good governance.
We cannot assume that data adequately anonymised today will
always remain so.
By the same token, the goals of initiatives like the Farr Institute
depend on being able to reliably link (when appropriate permis-
sions are granted) records between research data-sets – a practice
rendered extremely challenging after anonymisation techniques
are applied. This prompted the practice of replacing identiﬁable
attributes with a pseudonym, referred to as pseudonymisation.
This process provides a means of not only matching more reli-
ably between datasets, but also a link back to the identiﬁable
record for those who  are authorised to do so. Obviously this raises
the likelihood of unauthorised participant re-identiﬁcation during
the practice of research, placing a greater duty of care on data
controllers, a need for more robust risk mitigation strategies and
rendering anonymisation redundant in some cases.
2.3. Consent or anonymise: challenging the existing paradigm
Despite its immediate and superﬁcial appeal, the limitations of
the ‘consent or anonymise’ paradigm have been well recognised
in research governance circles. The establishment of the PIAG in
2001 is precisely an example of how such limitations have been
addressed. The group acted in an advisory capacity to the Sec-
retary of State to authorise uses of patient-identiﬁable data for
research when consent was neither present nor practicable [25]. It
has since morphed into the Conﬁdentiality Advisory Group (CAG)
acting under the HRA [26], and it is the HRA that now has the legal
power to authorise data linkages for research under the new Care
Act 2014. This, however, must be subject to research committee
approval. Thus the role of CAG – or a similar entity – is set to become
a permanent centre stage feature in the research governance arena.
As a governance approach, it is an example of ‘authorisation’ of
research practices. Namely permissions on linkage occur only after
careful and close deliberation of the merits and risks of any pro-
posed research using data. The PIAG and CAG have gone to great
lengths to be transparent about their processes [27]. A similar
approach was  adopted in Scotland through the Privacy Advisory
Committee (PAC), established in 1991, to advise two  of the largest
custodians of heath data in the country: National Services Scot-
land of NHS Scotland and the National Registers of Scotland [28]. It
operated on similar levels of transparency and accountability. The
PAC approvals process has recently been superseded by the newly
formed Public Beneﬁt and Privacy Panel for Health and Social Care
(PBPP) [29]. The PBPP provides a streamlined approvals process
for applications wishing to access NHS Scotland-originating data.
Again, the PBPP is dedicated to facilitating robust and transparent
scrutiny of data access, and the Panel bolsters direct involvement
of members of the public in both scrutinizing and deciding upon
data access applications. However, a notable difference north and
south of the border is the role of legislation. Scotland has not seen
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he need to legislate, relying instead on the public interest in pro-
oting scientiﬁcally sound, ethically robust research. These are the
uiding parameters for the work of the PBPP. In England and Wales,
he legislative route has been preferred, and we see the same guid-
ng principles now enshrined in the Care Act 2014 which requires
he HRA to:
‘. . .have regard to the need—
(a) To protect participants and potential participants in health or
social care research and the general public by encouraging
research that is safe and ethical, and
b) To promote the interests of those participants and potential
participants and the general public by facilitating the conduct
of such research.’ (Section 111(2))
Furthermore, Section 111(3) of the 2014 Act states that:
‘The HRA must promote the co-ordination and standardisation
f practice in the United Kingdom relating to the regulation of
ealth and social care research; and it must, in doing so, seek
o ensure that such regulation is proportionate.’  [30] (emphasis
dded).
No further speciﬁcs on how to discharge these duties are pro-
ided. We suggest that it is here that the work of the Farr Institute
an prove to be invaluable. We  offer two examples from our work
o date: (i) the development and operation of the safe haven in
ales, and (ii) the design and delivery of proportionate governance
n Scotland.
.4. The safe haven: a new panacea?
A safe haven can be deﬁned as a specialist, well governed, inde-
endently scrutinised [31] and accredited environment. There are
ifferent models within the concept of the safe haven, with some
lso serving long-term repositories for a collection of datasets as
ell as hosting an environment where data can be accessed for
esearch. This section uses the Secure Anonymised Information
inkage (SAIL) system as a case study to outline brieﬂy the role
f the safe haven, including some of its main strengths and weak-
esses. The SAIL system is an example of a safe haven that is also a
epository, and it contains a range of anonymised routine datasets
bout the population of Wales.
Subject to regulatory and governance approvals, anonymously
inked data required to answer research questions are made acces-
ible within the safe haven, which is referred to as the SAIL Gateway.
he Gateway acts as an analysis platform with a range of soft-
are packages, so that data can be analysed therein without being
eleased from the system. One of the main strengths of a system
uch as SAIL is in having the data in one databank, thus saving time
n data acquisition and facilitating research readiness. However,
his may  also be perceived by some as a weakness, and a risk as
 possible Big Brother [32]. Thus it is imperative that (i) such sys-
ems have robust data security and governance frameworks, (ii) are
ubject to independent scrutiny and (iii) proposals to use the data
re assessed to ensure they have the potential for public/patient
eneﬁt whilst safeguarding privacy. Even so, there are many multi-
aceted challenges in striking the balance between data security
nd usefulness for research, requiring considerable investment in
nfrastructure and expertise. Although they appear to be emerging
s the ‘new panacea’, safe havens may  not provide the solution in all
ases. Some organisations may  not wish to or may  not be allowed
o by law to export their data. Furthermore, public(s) assurance and
onﬁdence are paramount to ensuring acceptability.dical Informatics 84 (2015) 933–940
2.5. Principled, proportionate, and risk-based governance
The Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP) ran from
2009 to 2013 and was  funded by the Wellcome Trust to facilitate
so-called secondary uses of heath data for research, building on the
long-established, high-quality datasets held within Scotland [33].
Working closely with NHS Scotland as the principal data custo-
dians of much of Scotland’s health data, the SHIP interdisciplinary
consortium identiﬁed a set of key barriers to more effective and efﬁ-
cient sharing. These were: (i) lack of clarity of what was permitted
by law, (ii) confusion about when actors had the legal responsibil-
ity of acting as ‘data custodian’, (iii) lack of streamlined processes
for data linkage approvals (and agreed parameters for doing so),
and (iv) unmet need in information governance training [34]. The
result was  the development and delivery of a Good Governance
Framework (GGF) for SHIP, consisting of four elements:
1 An account of responsibilities of key actors and decision-makers
(largely a matter of clarifying who  is a data controller).
2 A capacity building facility for researcher training and accredi-
tation and wider awareness-raising (delivered through distance
learning).
3 A statement of Principles and Best Practices to guide decision-
making.
4 A mechanism of principled proportionate governance in making
data linkage assessments.
Importantly, the GGF embraces a principles-based approach,
that is, it recognises that sensitive decisions must be made that
require careful exercises of judgment [35]. Accordingly, it does
not seek to be overly prescriptive through a set of hard and fast
rules, but rather, provides decision-makers with key principles to
consider when scrutinising data linkage requests. Key principles
include the need to demonstrate public interest in the proposed
data linkage, and to require applicants to recognise and minimise
privacy risks. A crucial additional pragmatic component of the
GGF is its mechanisms of considering what proportionate gover-
nance looks like. It asks three fundamental questions: is the linkage
request dealing with,
1 safe people, e.g. those accredited by SHIP?,
2 safe data, e.g. those linked through SHIP, and
3 safe environments, e.g. a SHIP safe haven or equivalent, such as
SAIL [36].
If the answer to all of these questions is Yes, then a fast-track
route that requires no further scruinty of the application is available
for researchers. If the answer to any of these questions is No, then
other more scrutiny-intensive routes must be taken, including full
review by the PBPP. This, then, is an example of proportionality
in action, and one from which the HRA might learn some useful
lessons.
2.6. What has public engagement told us?
The lessons from the public and professional responses to the
initial roll-out of care.data are sobering. Any public interest or good
public-based initiative must ﬁrst have a clear basis for making a
claim that its foundations are well-established. As indicated above,
care.data did have a legal basis in the Health and Social Care Act
2012, but this was  not enough on its own  to prevent a backlash.
Law alone is insufﬁcient to command public and stakeholder sup-
port. Moreover, law works far better when it puts in place barriers
or protections against action; it is less adept at promoting partic-
ular ends that require sensitive and sensible human exercises of
judgment. Additionally, any (legal) framework for decision-making
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n data linkage must demonstrate its ability to remain ﬁt for
urpose over time, and to continue to reﬂect public groups’ and
ther stakeholders’ expectations, which can and do change. Thus
or care.data, it was not enough to say that similar types of use
nd linkage were already practised, albeit on a far less ambitious
cale. Finally and crucially, the prospect of proﬁt clearly impacts on
hat different sectors of society will tolerate, both within a pub-
ic health service and with respect to private and conﬁdential data
37].
Here again lessons can be learned from the work of the Farr
nstitute. Many of our regional efforts to date have involved public
nd stakeholder engagement, and our approaches to governance
ave taken the results into account. For example, in SHIP our focus
roup work showed a strong and repeated preference for a role
or consent in data linkage decisions, albeit that, when explored
urther, most participants recognised and accepted practical limi-
ations of consent for some kinds of research (as outlined above)
38]. Notwithstanding and as a direct response, the SHIP Good
overnance Framework now provides that any application to use
ata through SHIP must address directly the question of whether
 consent-based approach could be used. While it is possible to
rgue that anonymisation or authorisation are more appropriate
outes for any given application, all applicants must reﬂect on
he consent route and provide robust reasons as to why  it should
ot be followed. On commercial involvement, our team’s earlier
ublic engagement work on the Generation Scotland project –
o build a data and tissue resource to explore the role of genes
nd environment in the onset of disease – showed that there
re multiple ‘publics’ with differing views [39]. Speciﬁc patient
roups, for example, can tend to be more tolerant of commerce
han health groups [40]. Most interestingly and discerningly, how-
ver, our research found that it is not so much the prospect of
roﬁt that publics ﬁnd unacceptable, but the idea of ‘obscene’ proﬁt.
oreover, there is some evidence – to be tested further – that com-
itments to beneﬁt sharing can address some of these concerns
41].
The work of Farr CIPHER in Wales is built upon the gover-
ance principles developed in the SAIL system [42], and there
s an active Consumer Panel for Data Linkage Research [43,44]
hat, in dialogue with various SAIL panels, boards etc.; provides
 public viewpoint on the re-use of data in research. The Panel
xpressed a strong desire to be better informed about the data
inkage studies taking place, recognising that often academic pro-
osals and outputs are written for experts in the ﬁeld. As a result,
he Information Governance Approval Form now includes not only
 section for a lay summary, but also a section on the public
ngagement strategy. Further, and as anchored in the Consumer
anel’s Strategic Plan, strategies and measures are now in place
o facilitate and audit its increasing input into data linkage stud-
es.
Such transparency is reﬂected in the practices of CAG and the
BPP with respect to their approvals. Additonally, the Care Act 2014
ow provides that the HRA must publish guidance on ‘. . . (a) prin-
iples of good practice in the management and conduct of health
nd social care research; [and] (b) requirements, whether imposed
y enactments or otherwise, to which persons conducting health
r social care research are subject.’
Most recently, the Farr Institute held a workshop with data cus-
odians and researchers in order to identify key barriers against
nd facilitators of data reuse for health research purposes [45]. The
ack of transparency around care.data and the resultant damage
his may  have caused in terms of eroding trust around data reuse
merged as a key concern amongst participants. Civic engagement
s a means of engendering transparency as well as raising aware-
ess around the public beneﬁts of data reuse in research were key
riorities for stakeholders. A recent UK data sharing review echoesdical Informatics 84 (2015) 933–940 937
these sentiments. The report stresses that building trust ‘is the
responsibility of every digital stakeholder in the UK. It is a joint
effort, which needs to be a focus for the Government, business,
academia and the public’ [46].
Additional key ﬁndings suggest that risk aversion is a signif-
icant hindrance to data sharing and it was suggested that this
was caused by misunderstandings around which data reuses are
legally permitted and prohibited (and under which conditions). In
particular, different interpretations arose between data custodians
and researchers around consent requirements. These key concerns
will inform the future work of the Farr Institute and will shape
governance approaches developed throughout the course of the
initiative.
2.7. Constantly moving targets: cross-sectoral and international
linkages
All of the above advances have been achieved in the health sec-
tor and within individual countries of the United Kingdom. The
Farr Institute is designed to build on these developments at the
UK level, but the real step-changes that will signal success will be
demonstrated by delivering on these standards beyond the Farr
community in the UK. Two key targets are cross-sectoral linkages,
and safe and effective linkages beyond Farr
At present, a parallel initiative funded by the ESRC is its Admin-
istrative Data Linkage Centres (ADRC) Network [47], with an
associated linkage service. The service is designed to facilitate
research based on linked, routinely-collected administrative data
– for example education, crime, housing and employment – whilst
also including health data. There are particular challenges in acces-
sing and sharing some administrative datasets. For example, HM
Revenue and Customs is currently prevented by law from releas-
ing certain datasets to third parties such as data linkage centres or
researchers [48]. Innovative methods will be needed to enable safe
and meaningful data re-use. To this end, the Administrative Data
Taskforce reported in December 2012 [49], and the government
responded in June 2013 [50]. The Taskforce’s principal recommen-
dation was the establishment of ADRCs in each of the four countries
in the UK, as is now the case. Further and in its endorsement of this,
the government pointed to the good practices emerging from SHIP
and SAIL, and indicated that these had been strengthened ‘. . .from
April 2013 when the Health and Social Care Information Centre
(HSCIC) gained increased powers to provide data linkage services
that can be used by others [51].’ This, of course, is the body which
has been wrangling with the fall-out out from care.data. Notwith-
standing and as pointed out above, the salutary lesson is that mere
legislative provision to facilitate data linkage and sharing is not
enough. Indeed, this raises further questions about another of the
core recommendations of the Taskforce: the need for legislation. On
this point the government was  more circumspect, calling ﬁrst for a
mapping exercise to identify precisely (i) the current barriers and
(ii) where existing powers might be sufﬁcient but under-used. This
reﬂects the work of the Farr Institute thus far, in that our research
revealed not so much a problem with law per se, but a prevail-
ing attitude in some quarters that militated against data use. Such
a cultural reluctance cannot merely be legislated away. The proof
of the beneﬁts of sharing and linking must be clearly, amply and
repeatedly demonstrated to increase the public mandate. Indeed,
this goal was  identiﬁed as a key priority by Farr workshop partici-
pants.
A ﬁnal and crucial recommendation from the Taskforce was  also
recognised by the government: the need for a strategy for engaging
the public. However, we  would caution against the tone of the gov-
ernment’s response in terms of what can be reasonably expected
from any such strategy or plan of engagement. To cite the govern-
mental reply: ‘The public must be conﬁdent that access will only
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e made available for legitimate research purposes to approved
esearchers and that the outputs from analysis will in no way  com-
romise their privacy [52].’
This sets the bar very high in terms of privacy protection. If it is
o suggest that a ‘no risk’ approach to privacy is the only appropri-
te standard, it is likely to set up the entire enterprise for failure.
his is not to suggest that the highest standards should not be
ought, but rather to say that realistic expectations must be laid
own. All data use and linkage comes with some degree of risk. This
s simply a reality. Governance mechanisms such as safe havens,
ccreditation, risk-based proportionate governance and improved
esearcher training all do considerable work to minimise those
isks, as well as to maximise likely beneﬁts. But it is foolhardy
o suggest that a zero tolerance approach to privacy is possible.
t is likely only to result in disappointment and the undermining of
rust.
.8. Realising the vision
The vision of the Farr Institute is to harness health data for
atient and public beneﬁt by setting the international standard in
rustworthy reuse of electronic patient records and related linkable
ata for large-scale research.
When dealing with multiple sectors, diverse stakeholders,
ivergent legal systems and myriad datasets, it is clear that no
ingle model of governance will be suitable in all situations. The
trength of the Farr Institute is that it demonstrates the value of
istinct elements of governance that can be compiled in a com-
osite fashion to deliver the most robust framework in any given
ontext, while remaining ﬂexible and adaptable over time. The
merging top-level message is that no single paradigm nor gover-
ance tool is necessarily a preferred option. ‘Consent or anonymise’
as been shown to be inadequate on its own, and has necessitated a
hird option of ‘authorisation’. Safe havens are important technical
eans to deliver high levels of security, but they do not provide
nswers on the logically-prior ethical judgments about whether
ata access should be granted or certain data linked.
Other quasi-technical solutions are being developed elsewhere
hat attempt to empower citizens throughout the research process,
uch as the notion of dynamic consent whereby preferences (or
pt-outs) can be exercised as a research project evolves [53]. The
mportant point to note about these efforts is the value-base that
hey reﬂect. This is the notion of the primacy of the individual over
ther considerations such as the public beneﬁt of robust research.
dded to this, there might be unintended privacy consequences of
uch approaches, because they will necessarily require a techni-
al ability to always link downstream data uses to an identiﬁable
ndividual, in order for future preferences to be traced and given
ffect. Thus while dynamic consent offers the prospect of continu-
ng control that can be delivered by technical means, an on-going
ommitment to consent as a driver of health research governance
rivileges particular values and interests over others, here notably
ndividualistic concerns over wider public interests.
The Farr Institute does not envisage any one governance tool as
ecessarily optimal. Rather, we would emphasise the importance of
he triangulation of good governance, whereby consent, anonymi-
ation, and authorisation can work together and be deployed in
ifferent measures depending on the particular circumstances of
ny proposed linkage. It should not be forgotten, as so often hap-
ens, that even an authorisation body can require speciﬁc, informed
onsent to be obtained if it believes that this is the best means to
eliver the overall set of interests at stake.
Transparency in all of these efforts must be re-emphasised, with
espect to decisions about linkages and with respect to access poli-
ies and practices equally. This can be achieved in large part through
ublication on websites and social media, but the passive provisiondical Informatics 84 (2015) 933–940
of one-way information is only part of the picture. As care.data has
shown, the reality is that many citizens will remain in the dark
about many data linkage initiatives. Thus a robust and sustained
strategy of genuine public engagement is required, such as that
recommended by the ESRC’s Administrative Data Taskforce.
As for the research community itself, there must be a clear and
open invitation to access data safely, with appropriate safeguards.
Further, it will be crucial for all parties to understand that, in advo-
cating ‘open access’, there is no endorsement whatsoever of data as
a free-for-all. In other words, not everyone should have access to all
data available, regardless of their motivation or ability to meet the
necessary ethical and legal standards. Rather, the Farr governance
team endorses the approach of the Royal Society in its 2012 report
– Science as an Open Enterprise [54] – which helpfully proposes
a model of ‘Intelligent Openness’. This mandates robust curation
of valuable data, openness to sharing and clear commitment to
appropriate protection of privacy. Among other things, it promotes
principles not only of accessibility, but also of veriﬁability and of
intelligibility. This last criterion must be true as much for citizens
as for researchers who would access data.
There are many examples that suggest that the legislative route
is of limited value, especially with respect to promoting trust in
data linkages. Law must, of course, set non-negotiable parameters
of what is clearly unacceptable. Beyond this, however, good gov-
ernance must support and assist data linkage decision-makers to
weigh up a range of considerations and exercise good judgment.
Good governance rests unavoidably upon discretion; consider-
ations change over time and are another example of the moving
targets in this article. Good governance shifts with these changes,
and delivers understanding and reassurance of roles, responsibil-
ities and abilities with respect to responsible data sharing and
linkage.
Finally, more needs to be done to deliver genuine engagement
with stakeholders and public groups. We  still have a lot to learn
about what that means. It should include, for example, the pos-
sibility of inﬂuencing matters, including the direction of research
where appropriate. Two-way communication is key, as reﬂected
from the recent Farr workshop where participants stressed the
need for meaningful civic engagement. This is not just about deliv-
ering one-way information about what is going on. Moreover, it
must reﬂect a humility that we do not know all the answers before
we begin. This emphasises, once again, the crucial importance of
adaptive and receptive governance mechanisms.
3. Conclusion
The Farr Institute is aligning practices across institutions and
the countries of the UK with seamless data sharing for multiple
purposes. The common ethos is an openness to mutual learning and
cooperation. In delivering on this, we  suggest that the following key
lessons must be taken on board:
1. There is no magic bullet in delivering good governance: a vari-
ety of approaches is required; identifying and adopting these
approaches is crucial for the UK.
2. Guiding principles of responsible data linkage are a defensible,
ﬂexible and adaptable approach that can be of value across sec-
tors and countries. Central among these are the importance of
proportionality and mutual recognition of what counts as good
practice.3. Stakeholder and public engagement is key both to inform and
to shape governance over time – models must be receptive and
adaptive; the worth and the sustainability of any approach will
stand or fall by its ability to demonstrate these features.
G. Laurie et al. / International Journal of Me
Summary table
The authors shall provide a table with in 2–4 bullets statements
on ‘what was already known on the topic’ and also in 2–4 bul-
lets statements on ‘what this study added to our knowledge’.
Note that the second part of the table should not list the results
of the study as such. It should address what this study has
proven and what insights have been gained.
What is already known on the topic?
• Data linkage for health-related research is a growing and
complicated regulatory area.
• Currently, many  valuable uses of health data for health
research are being impeded.
• A standardisation of practice is sought around how data uses
are governed, whilst at the same time ensuring proportionate
regulation.
• Consent, anonymisation and most recently, safe havens have
been considered as solutions to the myriad governance chal-
lenges which regulation of health data face.
What this study has added to our knowledge?
• Key elements of good governance.
• Adaptive and reﬂexive governance models are essential in
order to achieve good governance and to address future
challenges.
• Two concrete examples are offered illustrating how we can
achieve standardisation of practice which facilitates propor-
tionate governance.
• Distinct elements of governance which are compiled in a
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[5] Department of Health, Information: To share or not to share? The Informationcomposite fashion can tend to current and future challenges.
Whilst the UK still has considerable progress to make, it is tak-
ng considerable steps towards delivering upon its goals for data
inkage.
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